We study the adoption of Common Application membership by private colleges and universities and estimate its effects on undergraduate admissions outcomes using data from the College Board's Annual Survey of Colleges.
Introduction
, the median number of college applications completed the previous year by first year students doubled from two to four (Pryor, Hurtado, Saenz, Santos, and Korn 2007) . Moreover, while 27.1 percent applied to at least four institutions in 1976, 56.5 percent did so in 2006. One explanation for the growth in applications and in postsecondary attendance more broadly is that the college wage premium has increased since the 1970s (e.g. Murphy and Welch 1993) . Moreover, the increased return to elite postsecondary institutions in particular may have generated even greater demand at prestigious colleges and universities (Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg 1999) .
A second explanation is that the market structure of postsecondary education has transformed from a collection of local markets into a nationally competitive marketplace (Hoxby 1997 ). In the current environment, colleges and universities have substantial incentives to maximize prestige relative to their competitors. Perhaps the most widely followed measure of prestige comes from the U.S. News and World Report's (USNWR) America's Best Colleges which rewards higher mean SAT scores, lower acceptance rates, and until recently, higher yield rates. Year to year changes in rankings affect the quality of enrolling students who act as inputs to educational production (Monks and Ehrenberg 1999) . There is even some evidence that institutions manipulate admissions processes to boost USNWR rankings in otherwise counterproductive ways (Avery, Glickman, Hoxby, and Metrick 2004) .
Our focus in this paper is an institutional choice that may generate advantageous changes in admissions outcomes. Each year since 1975, the Common Application (CAPP) non-profit organization issues a standardized application form that prospective students may submit to any institution that pays a membership fee. CAPP membership exhibits network externalities because it reduces the application price at every member institution -for any member, the number of additional applicants drawn in on the margin increases with membership size. Our model suggests that institutions with enrollment capacity constraints adopt CAPP membership to boost applications and mean SAT scores at the cost of lower yield rates.
To empirically test this theory, we analyze the diffusion of institutional CAPP adoption between 1975 and 2005 using data from the College Board's Annual Survey of Colleges.
Estimates from proportional hazards models stratified by Carnegie classification confirm the presence of network externalities: the probability of adoption conditional on being at risk increases with the CAPP membership share in the state. Alternative specifications reject the rival precedence effect described in Hannan and McDowell (1987) . We also find that the conditional probability of adoption decreases with the membership fee which may be surprising given that membership fees are small relative to annual institutional expenditures.
We then formally evaluate the effects of CAPP membership on undergraduate admissions outcomes. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to estimate the effects of a change in application price; the closest previous studies estimate the effects of tuition and financial aid on individual and aggregate application behavior (Savoca 1990; Curs and Singell 2002) . Estimates from OLS and instrumental variables models show that CAPP membership increases applications, admittances, and enrollment. Specifications with interaction terms show that these membership effects increase with network size. The membership effect on acceptance rates varies by specification but is typically small and positive. In contrast, we find consistent evidence that membership decreases yield rates. Falsification tests that vary the timing of adoption indicate that membership effects occur at adoption and then persist over time.
CAPP membership may also affect the characteristics of applicants, admitted prospective students, and enrolled students. In fact, the mission statement of the CAPP non-profit organization includes commitments to promote equity and access (The Common Application, 2007) . Unfortunately, data restrictions force us to focus on the characteristics of enrolled students rather than on applicants or admitted prospective students. We find that CAPP membership increases mean SAT scores and the percent students of color but decreases the percent low-income students, as proxied by Pell Grant recipients. Membership thus not only affects the number of people at each stage of the admissions process but the characteristics of those that ultimately enroll as well.
The Admissions Process and the Common Application

Application Behavior
Previous studies of postsecondary education emphasize the effects of list or net tuition on enrollment (Ehrenberg and Sherman 1984; Dynarksi 2002; Van Der Klaauw 2002) . Less attention is paid to the application stage, although there is some evidence that the probability of applying to an institution decreases with expected tuition and financial aid (Savoca 1990; Curs and Singell 2002) . We focus here on the effects of an application price change on aggregate applications and admissions outcomes more broadly. Expanding applicant pools is of increasing importance because to boost prestige, many institutions lower acceptance rates and offer preferentially packaged financial aid to enroll the best possible set of applicants.
We assume that postsecondary institutions maximize prestige subject to an enrollment capacity constraint. Institutions set enrollment targets in part to fill on-campus housing units or to prevent large class sizes. Reducing the application price in form of the opportunity time cost of completing an application induces new applicants on the margin to apply. 1 We assume that new applicants are less likely to matriculate conditional on admittance and may vary by other characteristics such as SAT score and family income. For example, middle-and high-income prospective applicants may have more price elastic application demand curves because they are more willing or able to pay the additional monetary application fees after the time cost reduction.
Institutions make admissions offers based in part on the expected matriculation probabilities of applicants. An application price reduction increases admittances because institutions recruit desirable new applicants that are less likely to enroll. Increasing applications and admittances has an ambiguous effect on the acceptance rate, while increasing admittances subject to an enrollment constraint reduces the yield rate.
A salient feature of CAPP membership is that it exhibits network externalities for institutions. Network externalities exist when the benefit of a good changes with the number of other agents consuming the same kind of good (Liebowitz and Margolis 2004) . In this case, the price reduction draws in people already applying to other member institutions with the CAPP application form, so the size of the network amplifies the increase (decrease) in applications (yield rate). A price reduction at a new member institution also induces non-users on the margin to use the CAPP application form because total time savings increases with the number of institutions that accept it. increase the expected profit of innovation adoption (Davies 1979 as described by Baptista 1999) .
The Diffusion of CAPP
Larger firms may also be better able to bear the risk of unsuccessful innovations.
In a representative reduced-form approach, Rose and Joskow (1990) show that larger firms are indeed more likely to adopt coal-fired steam-electric generating technology in the electric utility industry. Moreover, the probability of adoption conditional on being at risk increases with the price of the pre-innovation technology. Adoption may also be likely when its net benefit exhibits network externalities. For example, controlling for other economies of scale, banks with many local branches are more likely to adopt ATMs (automatic teller machines)
conditional on being at risk (Saloner and Shepard 1995) . The model is also flexible enough to include the strategic components of adoption. The conditional probability of ATM adoption by banks increases when competitors adopt the previous period, a phenomenon Hannan and McDowell (1987) describe as rival precedence.
However, external validity may be of concern when studying the diffusion of industryspecific innovations: it is not obvious that the diffusion of coal-fired steam electric technology or ATMs operate like innovations in postsecondary education. We are only aware of one study, Getz, Siegfried, and Anderson (1997) , that applies this approach to postsecondary education.
For thirty technologies including library, computing, and classroom innovations, the probability of adoption conditional on being at risk depends on institutional control, financial resources, and institution type (liberal arts, research, or university).
Data and Empirical Methods
The CAPP non-profit organization generously provided us with the complete adoption history of all institutional members since its inception in 1975. [ [ 1975, 1977, 1980, 1981, or 1983 . We impute missing values for interior points with linear interpolation and exterior points with the outermost non-missing value. 3 Mean SAT scores are re-centered and calculated as the average of the 25 th and 75 th percentile score at the institution. When missing, we convert ACT scores into re-centered SAT scores.
classification, where each institution is a Doctoral (PhD), Masters (MA), or Bachelors (BA) institution. Lastly, CAPP institutions house a greater share of their students on campus and are less likely to be religiously affiliated.
We describe the empirical diffusion strategy here because the resulting estimates will inform the subsequent program evaluation section of the paper. Our analysis of adoption centers on the hazard rate h in Equation 1. The hazard rate of institution i in period t is the instantaneous probability of failure conditional on being at risk of failure at t. In this setting, failure is the adoption of CAPP membership.
The hazard rate depends on the price of CAPP membership. The CAPP non-profit organization set constant price schedules for 1980-1982, 1983-1992, 1993-1999, 2000-2001, and 2002-2005 . Institutions are sorted into groups based on the previous year's total number of applications, and all institutions within each group are charged the same price. For example, the price schedule in 1993-1994 charged institutions with 0-999 applications $550, 1,000-1,499 applications $600, 1,500-1,999 applications $650, and 2,000-2,499 applications $700, 2,500-2,999 applications $750, and 3,000 or more applications $800. 4 We convert the price of membership into the price per first year enrolled student in 2005 dollars (priceperenroll it ). The mean price across all years is $3.36 per first year student.
The second variable of interest is our measure of network size, the CAPP membership rate in the network (excluding institution i) in period t (pctcapp_st it ). Ideally, we would construct annual revealed-preference networks of the type described in Avery, Glickman, Hoxby, and Metrick (2004) , but such data were not available to us. Instead, we define network competitors as other private institutions the state, although we experiment with specifications using Census divisions or Census regions instead. We also experiment with restricting networks to institutions within 50 and 100 point mean SAT score bands around the mean SAT score of institution i. Lastly, the hazard rate depends on a vector of institutional characteristics X it which includes mean SAT score (sat it ), mean SAT score squared (satsq it ), percent on-campus students (pctcampus it ), percent in-state students (pctinstate it ), urban and rural location dummy variables (urban it and rural it ), and a religious affiliation dummy variable (religion it ).
[ The hazard rates have three inflection points with peaks just after the inception of the CAPP non-profit organization and again in the mid-1990s. Wilcoxon tests reject the hypotheses that the hazard rates by Carnegie classification or by SAT groups are equal. PhD and most selective institutions consistently have the greatest conditional probabilities of adoption. The shapes of the functions, particularly those of MA and BA institutions that cross after period 12, do not conform to any of the well-known functions (i.e. exponential or Weibull). This suggests that a fully parametric specification of these forms would be misspecified. Thus, we estimate semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards model stratified by Carnegie classification as presented in Equation 2. Each Carnegie classification has its own baseline hazard rate, but we assume that the coefficients of the explanatory variables are the same across groups.
The second part of our empirical analysis estimates the effects of CAPP membership on a set of undergraduate admissions outcomes: applications, admittances, enrollments, acceptance rates, yield rates, mean SAT scores, percent students of color, and percent low-income students.
We calculate admissions outcomes for each first year cohort (both full-time and part-time) except for percent low-income students. We proxy for low-income family status with Pell Grant recipient status and calculate the percent low-income students as the percent of all undergraduate students (both full-time and part-time) that receive Pell Grants.
We employ a standard program evaluation approach in Equation 3, where we regress log admissions outcome k for institution i in year t on membership status and institutional characteristics in t-1 with state and year fixed-effects. The fixed-effects control for demographic and market structure changes. We also include log list tuition (log(tuition it-1 )) in t-1 as a control variable because previous studies show that it is associated with decreased enrollment (Allen and Shen 1999) . 5 However, the net cost of postsecondary education varies across students within institutions due to scholarships and other forms of financial aid. We also include the application fee (applyfee it-1 ) in t-1 in 2005 dollars which to our knowledge has yet to be used in the literature.
Because our measures of tuition and application fee have some measurement error in the early years of the panel, we restrict the evaluation sample to 1985 to 2005. We also restrict the sample to institutions that report admissions data in both t and t-1 to match those used our falsification tests described in the next section.
( ) Because membership may be endogenous, we estimate instrumental variables models using the insights generated from our diffusion model estimates. We approximate CAPP membership status in t-1 with a linear probability model and use membership in t-2, membership rate in the state in t-2, and membership fee in t-2 as instruments. With this approach, we assume that these three characteristics have no effect on admissions outcomes other than through their effects on membership in t-1.
Empirical Results
Diffusion of CAPP Adoption
We present our estimates for the baseline proportional hazards model in Table 2 . We use time-invariant independent variables (t=1974) to fix groups as they are before the onset of risk.
Only membership and network size are time-varying independent variables. The left panel uses the full sample of institutions where the baseline hazard is allowed to vary by Carnegie 5 We impute missing tuition in the Annual Survey of Colleges with figures from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). In cases where IPEDS reports tuition and fees together, we subtract estimated fee based on within-institution averages of the fee to total cost ratio over the entire period.
classification. The first column excludes institutional controls X it and shows that the conditional probability of adoption decreases by 25 percent for a one dollar increase in the price of membership. 6 We find suggestive evidence of network externalities in that a one percentage point increase in the membership rate in the state raises the hazard rate by 2.2 percent. The average state in the sample has 13.6 private institutions which implies that an additional member in the network raises the hazard rate by 16.2 percent. Column 2 adds the set of institutional controls. The hazard rate peaks at 1320 SAT points which is the 95 th percentile of SAT scores in 1974. In general, institutions with higher SAT scores are more likely to adopt CAPP membership conditional on being at risk. Institutions with high rates of on-campus residence are also more likely to adopt, perhaps because they have greater financial costs of coming below enrollment targets. Institutions with religious affiliations are less likely to adopt membership, most likely because they are only interested in a specific subset of potential applicants.
[ Table 2 . Cox Proportional Hazards Model, Coefficient Estimates]
We disaggregate the sample by Carnegie classification and SAT group in the middle and right panels respectively. This approach relaxes the assumption that the coefficients between groups are equal. PhD institutions are the only group that does not respond to the price of membership. This set of institutions typically has the most financial resources at their disposal.
The conditional probability of adoption increases with network size only for MA and middle SAT institutions which suggests that they are the ones that benefit most from recruiting additional applicants with the CAPP application form.
We also estimate several variants of these models which are not formally presented here but are available from the authors upon request. First, we experiment with defining networks as 6 Marginal effects for relative probabilities are equal to exp(coefficient estimate).
competitors in the Census division or Census region because prospective students are increasingly applying to colleges and universities outside their home states (Hoxby 19997) . We find evidence of network externalities at these broader geographic levels, but the estimates are similar to those using the state-based networks. Second, our results are robust to using timevarying measures of the independent variables. The main difference in this specification is that effects of network size differ by geography: hypothesis tests show that regional network externalities are stronger than those based on states. We also estimate models that use the number of members in the network or whether a member in the network adopted the previous year but do not find any evidence that they predict adoption. We take this as evidence against the rival precedence behavior found in previous empirical adoption studies (Hannan and McDowell 1987) . Lastly, because the non-parametric estimates in Figure 2 show that the hazard rates for MA and BA institutions cross, we verify that the results are not an artifact of our missing data imputation procedure that allocates Carnegie classification in 1988 Carnegie classification in to 1975 Carnegie classification in -1987 Our results are robust to artificially left-censoring the data in 1988.
Because the sample includes 25 institutions that ultimately drop CAPP membership, we estimate the determinants of the decision to stop membership as a comparison with the diffusion model results. We estimate a probit model of dropping membership on the set of institutions that ever adopt using the same set of independent variables described above. We find that institutions with smaller networks are more likely to drop CAPP membership. Institutions with greater (or lower) mean SAT scores than 1089 are more likely to drop membership conditional on ever adopting in the first place.
Admissions Outcomes
We now turn to estimating the effects of CAPP membership on admissions outcomes.
We present the results from our OLS estimates in Table 3 where each column is a separate regression for admissions outcome k. A main finding is that CAPP membership in t-1 is associated with a 24.8 percent increase in applications in period t. This is the first evidence that a reduction in the application price generates an increase in the number of applications. We also find that CAPP membership is associated with a 28.6 percent increase in admittances and a 15.3 percent increase in enrollment. The magnitude of this latter increase is surprisingly high and may indicate that the matriculation probability of new applicants is difficult to predict by admissions officers. Nonetheless, it does appear that institutions take advantage of the additional applications by admitting more prospective students. When we estimate the effects on the acceptance rate directly, we find that CAPP membership is associated with a 4.0 percent increase in the acceptance rate. In contrast, it is associated with a 16.5 percent decrease in yield rate. Our interpretation is that institutional membership expands its applicant pool but draws in many people who do not seriously consider enrolling there.
[ Table 3 .
OLS Membership Effects on Log Admissions Outcomes]
We also control for log tuition and application fee in t-1. Surprisingly, application fees and listed tuition are positively associated with applications. These results are consistent with Curs and Singell (2002) who find similar results for tuition on out-state applications to the University of Oregon. One interpretation is that applicants may be taking price as a signal of quality. Alternatively, institutions with higher application fees may have other characteristics that are desirable to applicants not controlled for by the urban and rural dummy variables such as athletic programs and neighborhood amenities. We also find that the yield rate decreases with the listed tuition which is consistent with previous empirical studies in the literature (Parker and Summers 1993) .
Institutional membership in CAPP may also generate changes in the characteristics of the students that ultimately enroll at the institution. We find that CAPP membership in t-1 is associated with a 1.4 percent increase in mean SAT scores. This supports our contention that CAPP membership generates benefits for institutions beyond the increase in applications. We also find that membership is associated with a 16.0 percent increase in the percent students of color and an 10.8 percent decrease in the percent Pell Grant recipients. These results suggest that CAPP membership enables institutions to select higher SAT score, higher income students of color. However, a more rigorous test of this hypothesis should be conducted with applicant micro-level data.
[ Table 4 .
OLS Membership Effects on Log Admissions Outcomes, Interaction Terms]
We test whether the effects of membership on admissions outcomes varies by several key institutional characteristics in Table 4 . The top panel presents estimates for OLS specifications that include the interaction between CAPP membership in t-1 and network size in t-1. We find evidence of network externalities in that a one percentage point increase in the network size is associated with a 0.7 percent increase in applications for CAPP members. We find similar evidence of network externalities for admittances and enrollment. Surprisingly, the effect on yield rates for members does not vary with the network size in the state. We expected the yield rate decrease to be larger in absolute value when network sizes are large.
The bottom panel presents estimates that include the interaction between membership and mean SAT scores. Membership increases applications more at higher SAT institutions, perhaps because applicants apply to more "reach" schools once the cost of doing so decreases.
Admittances increase more at lower SAT member institutions which suggests that they expect newly admitted students on the margin to be less likely to matriculate. Member institutions with higher SAT scores experience a decrease in the acceptance rate which provides evidence that the most selective institutions benefit from membership in terms of USNWR rankings. In contrast, the yield rate declines less in absolute value at higher SAT score colleges and universities. As expected, applicants that get into the most prestigious schools enroll there if admitted. These results confirm the positive effects of mean SAT score and network size on the hazard rate of adoption.
[ Table 5 .
IV Membership Effects on Log Admissions Outcomes]
However, the diffusion estimates in the previous subsection indicate that CAPP membership is endogenous. Table 5 presents the IV estimates using membership status, membership rate in the state, and membership fee in period t-2 as instruments for membership in t-1. This procedure does not alter the effects of CAPP membership in dramatic ways.
Membership continues to increase applications, admittances, and enrollment. There is small positive effect on acceptance rates and a large negative effect on yield rates. Moreover, we continue to find that membership raises SAT scores and the percent students of color but decreases the percent of Pell Grant recipients.
[ 
The estimates in Table 6 indicate that the effects of adoption occur at adoption. Adoption in t-1 increases applications by 7.0 percent and admittances by 4.3 percent in t. There are no effects on enrollment, but adoption last year decreases both acceptance rates and yield rates. The coefficient estimates are smaller in magnitude than those in the OLS and IV specifications. Our interpretation is that these effects are the estimates only for the first year after adoptionsubsequent experience with membership may be associated with larger effects because network sizes will have increased. The lack of systematic significant effects by two or three year lagged adoption suggests that the dynamics of membership effects are a one-time persistent jump at adoption. The non-significant coefficients in the future suggest that there is no Ashenfelter-dip phenomenon taking place here (Ashenfelter 1978) .
Concluding Remarks
We find evidence that Common Application membership is a strategic decision by private colleges and universities. In our evaluation, positive CAPP membership effects on applications, admittance, and enrollment increase with mean SAT score and network size. These results are consistent with the diffusion estimates that show the net benefit as measured by these characteristics increase the hazard rate of adoption. Our analysis of CAPP membership supports the hypothesis that the postsecondary education market has structurally evolved into a more competitive marketplace.
We also find that CAPP membership affects the composition of students that ultimately enroll. In both OLS and IV specifications, membership is associated with a small increase in SAT scores and an increase in the percent students of color. We also find that membership is associated with a marked decrease in the percent Pell Grant recipients at the institution. These results imply that the Common Application non-profit organization has had mixed success in meeting its goals of increased access and equity. To the extent that institutions are interested in recruiting low-income students, CAPP membership may bring overwhelming competition by otherwise desirable applicants.
There are at least two limitations to our analysis. First, we do not address the fact that many institutional members require applicants to complete supplemental forms. These forms provide institutions with idiosyncratic information unavailable in the standardized application form. In fact, unpublished data from the College Board from 2000 to 2004 shows that over half of all institutions that accept the CAPP application form require applicants to complete at least one supplemental form. A second limitation is that many institutions accept the CAPP application form without actually paying the membership fee. However, the prevalence of this activity is likely to decline over time because applicants are increasingly applying online -online applications are submitted directly to the CAPP non-profit organization rather than the institution. Both of these limitations suggest that our estimates are lower bounds on the true effects of CAPP membership. .10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. The sample consists of institution-years without imputed current and one-year lagged values of the dependent variable. Models include one-year lagged percent in-state and urban and rural dummy variables as independent variables and year and state fixed-effects. Instruments for one-year lagged membership is two-year lagged membership, members share in the state, and membership fee. 
